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11United States Medicare is a federal program which provides some medical services to
seniors, the disabled and patients with end-stage renal disease. In arguing for a U.S. prescription
drug plan for Medicare enrollees, Soumerai and Ross-Degnan (1999) cite research that finds only
56 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had some prescription drug coverage in 1997, with that
provided through private employers, private insurance to supplement Medicare, Medicaid
(another federal program that provides medical care for the indigent) or Medicare Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). They also cite research outlining gaps in these kinds of
coverages. For example, Medicare HMO drug coverage is typically subject to annual caps of as
low as US$600 and the clear majority of Medicare enrollees with incomes below the federal
poverty threshold are not enrolled in Medicaid (although in 14 states there are some drug benefits
for low income non-Medicaid seniors). 
1. Introduction
Both major political parties in the United States are reported as developing proposals
for publicly funded and provided  prescription drug programs for seniors (Toner, 1999).  The
National Academy of Social Insurance examined a variety of alternatives with various
coverage, deductible, co-payment, maximum and stop-loss provisions and estimated costs as
ranging from US$17 billion to US$24 billion, roughly 10 per cent of existing Medicare costs
and approximately one-third of a per cent of GDP (Gluck, 1999).1  In this study we try to
evaluate some of the redistributive aspects of a public drug plan for seniors by examining the
effects on out-of-pocket expenditures of such drug plans in Canada.   Between 1970 and 1986,
all Canadian provinces introduced subsidy programs for prescription drug use by those age 65
and over and have continued to adjust these programs to the present time.  Table 1 summarizes
22For further information, see Grootendorst (1999). Note that before 1970, British
Columbia (B.C.) had a program available for low income seniors and in other provinces, some
seniors may have acquired prescription drugs though social assistance programs.
3Canada provides an interesting source of evidence on the potential effects of various
expansions of public health insurance that might be considered in the U.S.  Not only does Canada
have much more extensive public insurance, but elements of public insurance were introduced in a
staggered way across provinces providing a number of “natural experiments”.  For example,
Gruber and Hanratty (1995) use the introduction of National Health Insurance in Canada to study
the disemployment effects of such schemes. 
these programs very briefly. 2,3  Unfortunately the nature of the programs, the timing of their
introduction and  adjustment, and particularly the available data do not yield ideal conditions
for the analysis of a “natural experiment”.  Nonetheless in this study we use the existing
information to draw some conclusions as to how these programs have affected out-of-pocket
expenditure.  In brief we will conclude that if we accept a first-order approximation that will be
accurate if price responses are small (a position that is consistent with published empirical
findings), the evidence is that from a purely redistributional perspective, prescription drug
subsidies were less beneficial to low income households than if the same dollars had been put
into a program of fixed cash transfers, paid equally to all households, regardless of income.
However the subsidies were probably mildly more beneficial to low income households than an
equal-valued cash transfer set equal to a fixed percentage of income. Hence there appears to be
no strong support for such plans so ely on income distribution grounds.
We recognize that prescription drug subsidies could improve (or worsen) market
efficiency.  For example, adverse selection might result in coverage being denied to those
willing and able to pay for it and public drug coverage could resolve this.    Subsidies might
also encourage the use of pharmaceuticals which substitute for other more costly forms of
34See Peabody, Bickel and Lawson (1996) for some evidence of the effects on price of a
national prescription drug purchasing body in Australia.
5A reduction in supply price may reduce research and development expenditure, although
not necessarily in the jurisdiction of the drug plan.
publicly funded health care, such as hospitalizations.   Finally, a public drug plan may change
the supply price of drugs.  In particular it is sometimes argued that such a plan may provide
prescription drugs at a lower unit cost through the introduction of some degree of market
power in the public purchase of drugs (perhaps offsetting monopolistic power held by
pharmaceutical drug producers).4,5 However the family expenditure data set we employ is not
informative on these issues because we do not know the actual drugs or their prices, only total
household expenditure on prescription drugs. While efficiency aspects may well be important,
the motivation behind the proposed pharmaceutical drug plans clearly includes distributional
issues, and hence it may be useful to investigate the Canadian experience from that perspective.
The basic approach and the data are described in Sections 2 and 3 respectively.  Section
4 examines the distribution of out-of-pocket expenditures on prescription drugs using
descriptive statistics and applied econometric techniques.  The latter include semiparametric
regressions  that allow for a very flexible relationship between expenditures and income while
controlling for the influence of gender, age, region, marital status and household size in a
tractable way.  Section 5 concludes.
2. The Approach
The “textbook” analysis of the incidence of a commodity subsidy proceeds as follows.
46Our use of total outlay can be motivated by a two stage (inter-temporal, followed by
intra-temporal) budgeting model, or more loosely by the observation that total outlay (from
which we exclude purchases of cars and recreational vehicles) is closer to “permanent income”
than is current income.  In what follows, we use the terms “high outlay” and “low outlay”
interchangeably with “high income” and “low income” respectively. 
7Some tax cuts might in some instances approximate such a program.  
Suppose each household h f H households has an indirect utility function:
vh = v(xh, p, zh)     (1)
where xh is total outlay, p is a vector of prices and zh is a vector of household characteristics.
6  
Then by Roy’s Identity, the effect of an increase in pi is:
Mvh /Mpi = -qi(Mvh/Mxh) (2)
or, in terms of percentage changes in prices:
Mvh /M lnpi = -piqi(Mvh/M lnxh)/xh = -ù ih Mvh/M lnxh  (3)
where ù ih is the expenditure share for commodity i of household h. This is just one formal way
of capturing the notion that if a program reduces incrementally the price paid for commodity i,
the gain to a household depends upon how much that household is currently spending on that
commodity.  A direct implication of (2) is that if the total government outlay on the commodity
subsidy to all households is $1 and we compare this to the alternative of a program which
divides the $1 up equally so that each household receives a cash transfer of $1/H (th t is each
household’s budget increases by the same absolute amount),  a household will prefer the
commodity subsidy if and only if its absolute expenditure on the commodity is above the
household average.  Similarly (3) implies that if the alternative program is a cash transfer that
increases each household’s income by the same percentage amount7, a household will prefer the
58Note that even though the utility gains in (2) and (3) depend upon the household’s
marginal utility of income, which may not be comparable across households, the value of the
marginal utility of income does not affect a single household’s preference between an incremental
commodity subsidy and a cash transfer. 
commodity subsidy if and only if its expenditure share on the commodity is above average.8
A policy might be supported on pure income distribution grounds if it is more
redistributive than a cash transfer (i.e. if it is preferred to a cash transfer by those with low
incomes).  We call such a policy rogressive.  Keeping with the textbook analysis, an
incremental commodity subsidy might therefore be thought of as progressive if absolute dollar
expenditure on that commodity falls with income (the subsidy represents a greater dollar saving
to households of low means than to those of high means) or, more weakly, if that commodity’s
budget share falls with income (the subsidy constitutes a greater percentage budgetary saving
for households of low means than for those of high means).  Hence those who favor
redistribution tend to favor, all other things equal, subsidizing more and taxing less those
commodities whose consumption, measured absolutely or as a budget share, tends to fall with
income.  This suggests that an examination of how out-of-pocket prescription drug expenses
vary with income can be an important component of an analysis of the distributional impact of a
public drug plan.  We begin our analysis in this way, using simple descriptive statistics as well as
semiparametric regression techniques (described below) to characterize the relationship of the
household’s budget share of pharmaceutical drugs to total household outlay (that is, Engel
curves).
One well known problem with the textbook analysis of incidence outlined above is that
it is a first-order approximation and thus is only really appropriate for infinitesimal price
6changes.  Policies of the type we are interested in involve discrete and substantial price changes. 
Knowledge of the price elasticities of the commodity in question allows for a more accurate
second-order approximation, and, in principle, estimation of a complete demand system allows
for the calculation of exact welfare changes. (See Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996) for a
recent discussion of these alternatives.)
Unfortunately, our data are not well suited to the estimation of price elasticities for
prescription drugs.  In his review of the U.K. and U.S. literature, Hurley (1990) notes that most
estimates of the price elasticity of drug use are very small (-0.1 to -0.2), although typically the
copayments examined have been modest.  One important study is Leibowitz, Manning and
Newhouse (1985) who found elasticities in this range for the Rand randomized-controlled trial
of drug copayments applied to non-Medicaid and non-senior U.S. trial participants. Research
directly on the copayments introduced into Canadian provincial prescription drug plans for
seniors (as described in Table 1) has largely confirmed these findings: three published studies
(Grootendorst, O’Brien and Anderson, 1997; Poirier et al, 1998 and Hux and Fielding, 1997)
and two unpublished studies for Nova Scotia and British Columbia all find very small price
responses, although one other study (Grootendorst, 1997) finds substantial price responses for
low income single males in British Columbia. Of recent U.S. studies, perhaps the most relevant
is that of Johnson et al (1997) who estimate an elasticity of -0.13 for low income elderly HMO 
beneficiaries while Smith (1993) and Harris, Stergachis and Ried (1990) estimate elasticities of
even smaller magnitude for an employment related drug plan and a HMO respectively. The
79Our settling for a first order approximation also bypasses another complication.  If we do
take a second order approximation by differentiating (3) again with respect to log price, the result
will involve not only the price elasticity of demand but the product of budget share and the
derivative of marginal utility of income with respect to log price. The approximation error from
omitting this second component of the second term of the expansion will therefore be smaller the
smaller is budget share, and the average budget share of prescription drugs is small.  Nevertheless,
a second order approximation that used price elasticities but did not also specify this additional
derivative would be incomplete, because assuming price independence of the marginal utility of
income is a strong restriction on preferences.  To see this, recall that the indirect utility function is
homogeneous of degree zero in income and prices, so that, by the derivative property of
homogeneous functions, the marginal utility of income must be homogenous of degree minus one
in income and prices.  If the marginal utility of income is independent of prices, then it must be
homogenous of degree minus one in income alone. The only such function is Mv/Mx=k/x, where k
is a constant.  Integrating, and allowing the constant of integration to depend on prices, gives v =
k*ln(x) + á(p), which is an indirect utility function corresponding to homothetic preferences (for
further details, see Theorem 1 and the associated discussion in Banks, Blundell and Lewbel
(1996)).  Homotheticity is very restrictive, and implies that budget shares are independent of
income - goods are neither necessities nor luxuries.  Thus assuming price independence of
marginal utilities amounts to an assumption which makes estimation of Engel curves unnecessary.  
smaller price elasticities are, the better first-order approximations may be expected to perform.9 
Thus much of our interpretation will proceed on the assumption that the first order
approximation suffices. We will revisit the issue in our concluding section.  
In the context of a prescription drug subsidy, there are a number of other reasons why
the textbook analysis may be inappropriate.  First, a nontrivial number of households have no
prescription drug expenditures.  An incremental price reduction will provide no utility gain to
those who use zero prescription drugs (because they still will use zero after the price change)
but a discrete price reduction may induce usage and hence “zero users” require special
consideration.
Second, many of the observed (and most of the proposed) prescription drug subsidy
plans feature user charges, including fixed fee copayments, and sometimes deductibles and other
810Most of the prescription drug plans have formularies that do not include all possible
drugs, although sometimes there is a very good formulary substitute for a nonformulary item.
11In some cases exploiting program benefits may require keeping track of copayments (in
cases where there is a maximum out-of-pocket) or keeping track of individual expenditures
because of a cumulative deductible.
12For example it may be that individuals of different means may be more or less aggressive
with the prescriber, or prescribers may be more likely to prescribe if they know patients are more
able to afford any out-of-pocket cost.  Alternatively, either patient or prescriber behaviour may
vary with the insurance status of the patient, and that in turn may vary with income. 
provisions as well.  This means that the subsidy varies with drug consumption and in some
cases, income; a kinked budget constraint again invalidates the standard analysis. 
Furthermore, it may be that individuals of different economic circumstances have
different probabilities of using nonformulary prescription drugs,10 have different numbers of
uninsured individuals in their households or have different degrees of success in gaining
financial benefit from the plan.11  Fi ally, we note that the presence of a public prescription drug
plan may also affect prescriber behaviour or the interaction between patient and prescriber, or
the interaction between insurers and the insured in different ways for patients of different
means.12
For the reasons just listed, we extend our analysis beyond the Engel curve
characterization prescribed by the textbook analysis to examine the out-of-pocket expenditures
on prescriptions by various income groups before and after the implementation of actual plans. 
Suppose for example that the introduction of a drug subsidy coincided with a larger fall in
prescription drug expenditure for low income households than high income households.  Under
the maintained assumption that price responses are negligible, this would indicate that the policy
change was more progressive (in the sense described above) than equal public expenditure on a
913There were also FAMEX surveys in 1978 and 1982 but the resulting data releases did not
contain information on pharmaceutical expenditures. 
14In 1992, C$1=US$.83. Currently C$1=US$.69.
per household absolute cash transfer.  Similarly if the pe centage point fall in the budget shares
of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures was larger among low income households than
among high income households, the policy change would be described as more progressive than
a cash transfer that increased each household’s budget by the same percentage. 
This further analysis is informative about a world that is richer than the textbook model
allows, and in which some or all of the kinds of effects listed above may be important.  By
examining the data before and after the implementation of actual plans, we can roughly capture
these other kinds of effects by studying the actual rather than the projected (or counter-factual)
changes in out-of-pocket expenditure.
3.  Data
The Canadian Family Expenditure (or FAMEX) data is a series of cross sectional
surveys conducted by Statistics Canada at irregular multi-year intervals from 1969 to 1996.  
Lower population regions such as the Atlantic provinces are over-sampled.  Surveys are taken
from household members by personal interview; income is reconciled with expenditure and
saving.  We choose the 1969, 1974, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1992 and 1996 surveys as these data
sets contain prescription drug expenditure information.13  We the  limit the sample in all years
to respondents in 15 urban centers as the surveys were limited to these centers in 1974, 1984
and 1990.  We convert all dollar values into 1992 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.14
10
15The Canadian income tax system does provide some relief for large medical expenses, in
effect paying about 25% of expenses in excess of about $1,600.  This relief diminishes if the
individual or her/his spouse has income for tax purposes in excess of about $50,000.  Figures for
medical expenditures below do not include this income tax relief. 
16The budget share of out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures is larger among senior
households than among working age households in every year for which we have data.
Table 2 summarizes some of the important national trends for seniors (households with head of
age 65 or over and spouse, if present, also of age 65 or over) and, by way of comparison, for
nonsenior (or “working age”) households.15
Table 2 shows that for both senior and nonsenior households, out-of-pocket household
prescription drug expenditures were relatively small in 1969 (less than $250). For both seniors
and nonseniors, prescription drug expenditures fell to less than $100 by 1984 and then rose
more recently, more sharply for seniors than for others but still less than 1969 levels.  Note that
prescription drug costs are only about a quarter of all out-of-pocket medical expenditures
(including eyeglasses, hearing aids and dentistry) for nonsenior households and about a third for
seniors. 
Table 2 reveals that senior households spend more on prescription drugs than nonsenior
households absolutely; this is also true as a proportion of total outlay.  For example, in 1996 the
budget share of out-of-pocket spending on prescription drugs was 1.4% for senior households
and 0.5% for nonsenior households.16  A reader might conclude that this fact, along with the
fact that seniors are on average a low income group, constitutes a redistributive argument for
prescription drug plans for seniors.  We would argue against this conclusion.  Seniors are an
easily identified group and thus can be targeted with the type of straight cash transfers we have
discussed. Thus any redistributive argument for a prescription drug plan for seniors must rest on
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how progressively such a plan targets assistance within the population of senior households. 
Thus our subsequent analysis focuses exclusively on expenditure patterns and changes in
expenditure patterns within the senior population. 
Figure 1 displays a scatter plot of budget shares against the logarithm of total outlay for
senior households drawn from the years 1969, 1986, and 1996.  Several features of the data are
immediately apparent, including a substantial fraction of zeros, and a small group of very large
budget shares (budget shares greater than 15% are labeled by the year in which they occurred.)
We now turn to an investigation of these expenditure patterns.
4. Results
4.1 Semiparametric Engel Curves
We begin our analysis of the incidence of such prescription drug subsidies by
characterizing the relationship between the budget share of out-of-pocket prescription drugs
and income (or total outlay).  We do so in a multivariate framework.  This is an attempt to
isolate the relationship between such expenditures and income from other determinants of
demand such as household size and other demographics.  Because a general nonpar m tric
model for prescription drug share for household h 
 ùh = f(ln xh, zh) + åh   (4)
would have too many dimensions and be infeasible to estimate and interpret, we instead posit a
semiparametric model
ùh = g(ln xh) +zhâ + åh, (5)
that is, we allow the expenditure share (ùh)  to be a flexible function of the log of total income
12
17The beginning of retrenchment was perhaps marked by the introduction of copayments
by British Columbia in 1987. Subsequent cutbacks by other provinces are described in Table 1.
18Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia have charged prescription drug plan premiums
to seniors since the 1990s but we have omitted these from this analysis, partly because except for
Nova Scotia after September, 1996 where explicit opt-out provisions were introduced, it is
difficult to distinguish a “premium” from a tax.
(ln xh) but restrict the household attributes (zh) to affect the share in the linearly additive way
assumed for standard linear regression analysis.  This “hybrid” approach allows us to keep the
dimensionality of the model down but still allow a detailed analysis of the relationship of
prescription drug expenditure share to income. 
There are at least two methods to estimate models such as (5) discussed in the literature. 
Blundell and Duncan (1998) discuss a method due to Robinson (1988) which is fully efficient. 
We first estimated the models discussed here using this method and also performed the test they
propose (p. 78) of the null hypothesis that ln xh is exogenous; the null hypothesis was not
rejected.  However, we also tried the “differencing” method discussed by Yatchew (1998). 
This method is not fully efficient in a statistical sense but is much more rapid computationally
and in the cases where both methods were tried, produced estimates which were very similar to
those produced by the Robinson method.  The following results use this differencing method.
Table 3 gives the coefficients (the estimates of â in (5)) corresponding to various
household attributes. The first column corresponds to the older population in 1969 (before
almost all the public plans for seniors were available), the second column reports results for
1986 (when the programs were perhaps at the peak of their generosity17) and th  third column
presents estimates for 1996.18 
 The coefficients are multiplied by one hundred, so that they should be read as
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percentage points.  Thus the budget share of prescription drugs was more than one percentage
point higher for married senior households than unmarried in 1969, and this gap was statistically
significant.  In 1986 there was no significant gap, while in 1996 the gap was significant again,
with the budget share of married households almost a percentage point higher than for
unmarried households. 
There are no significant effects of gender or household size. The latter may reflect the
fact that among the senior population most of the variation in household size is between one
and two person households and this variation is largely captured by the “married” dummy
variable. There are significant regional effects, and they vary across years. We return to this in
the next section.  
More relevant for the textbook analysis is Figure 2, which plots, for each of the three
years noted above, estimates of g(ln xh), the relationship of the out-of-pocket budget share of
prescription drugs to income. (Of course the nonparametric portion cannot be condensed to a
vector of coefficients and must be represented graphically.)  It can be seen  that, conditional
upon the variables in Table 3, the relationship has a downward slope, indicating that
expenditure share falls with income in each year.  This suggests that a prescription drug subsidy
may provide a greater benefit to low income senior households.  Note, however, that the slopes
are not very steep as the horizontal scale is in logarithms of total outlay. The relationship
between budget shares and the logarithm of income is roughly linear in each year, particularly
the most recent two.
Figure 2 does reveal interesting differences between the years. Across almost the whole
range of total outlay, budget shares fall from 1969 to 1986 and then rise again by 1996 (though
14
19The predicted budget shares in Figure 2 are constructed to have the same mean as the actual budget shares in each
year by adding back the (yearly) mean of zhâ.
not to 1969 levels).19  It also appears that the relationship between the budget share of out-of-
pocket prescription expenditures and income flattened after 1969.  In the next section, we
investigate these changes across time, and decompose them by region. 
4.2 Data by Region Through Time 
Following the outline of Section 3, we now consider changes in the pattern of out-of-
pocket prescription drug expenditures by region and through time.  The FAMEX groups the
provinces of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick as the
Atlantic region and Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta as the Prairie region. (Hence some
cross-provincial variation is unobservable.) However, the provinces of British Columbia,
Ontario and Quebec each comprise their own region.  Because the regional samples are smaller,
we concentrate on simple descriptive statistics (and supporting regression analysis) as opposed
to the nonparametric analysis of the previous section.  Table 4 provides, by region, mean real
out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditure, budget share and percentage of zero purchasers
for high income and low income senior households (top 25% and bottom 25% by outlay). 
The overall trend through time is as was suggested by Figure 2.  Between 1969 and
1986 as more subsidies were introduced, the fall in absolute prescription drug expenditures and
budget shares was sharp for both high income and low income senior households for almost all
regions.  However, as provinces moved towards higher copayments and deductibles in the late
1980s and the 1990s, this fall was reversed, particularly for high income seniors.  This reversal
15
may also reflect the great increase in the variety and cost of  available pharmaceutical drugs.
The effects of the provincial programs are reasonably clear in the regional data.  It
appears that the Atlantic provincial programs (introduced in Nova Scotia in late 1974 and in
New Brunswick and Newfoundland between 1974 and 1984) had some impact in reducing out-
of-pocket costs between 1974 and 1984 and there was a further reduction by 1986 as the
smallest province of Prince Edward Island also introduced a program. The effect of increasing
copayments is also evident in the more recent increases in out-of-pocket expenditures,
especially among high income seniors. The trend in expenditures data for Quebec is consistent
with the staggered introduction of a no-cost-sharing plan for low income seniors in August,
1974 and then for all seniors in October, 1977. There are also evident effects of copayments
introduced for high income seniors during 1992 and for all seniors during 1996.  Similarly, the
effect of a no-cost-sharing program introduced in Ontario late in 1974 (initially only for low-
income seniors but by 1975 for all seniors) is clear as is the introduction of income-contingent
copayments half way through 1996.  British Columbia displays a similar pattern as a full cost
sharing program for all seniors was introduced at the beginning of 1974 and copayments were
introduced in 1987 and increased in 1994.  
Two of the three Prairie provinces had substantial percentage copayments in their initial
programs, and out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures fell only for high income
households between 1969 and 1986 while they actually increased for low income households.
We will discuss this further below.  The reduction in generosity of the programs in all three
Prairie provinces during the late 1980s and the 1990s has tended to increase expenditures for
both low and high income households.  
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To interpret these data in terms of distributive effects, first consider the situation in
1969.  High income seniors spend considerably more on drugs than low income seniors in
absolute terms, although high income seniors also have a smaller budget share except in B.C
where there was already in 1969 a public program available for low income seniors. Hence
under the maintained assumption of negligible price response, it would have been predicted that
a drug subsidy would have been less progressive than a per household cash transfer to seniors
but more progressive than a percentage-of-budget transfer. The experience for the period from
1969 to 1986 (from almost no subsidies to peak generosity) is largely consistent with this
prediction: absolute dollar expenditure reductions in all regions were higher for high income
households.  In most regions, budget shares fell more for low income households (for example
in Quebec, a fall of 2.1 percentage points from .025 to .004 for low income households but 1.3
percentage points from .015 to .002 for high income households).  But the case of the Prairies
is striking.  There, out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures decreased for high-income
households between 1969 and 1986, both in absolute dollars and as a budget share, but
increased for low income households.  It seems clear that the reason is the higher copayments
in the Prairie provinces, particularly in Manitoba and Alberta.  That is, an increase in usage by
low income households on the Prairies led to increased expenditures because of the substantial
copayments, whereas any increase in usage in other jurisdictions was insufficient to increase
expenditures, given the smaller copayments.  The increase in usage by Prairie low income
households could be a price response to the subsidy (the subsidization increasing usage between
1969 and 1986) and hence falsify our maintained assumption.  However it could also be the
consequence of one or more other factors, including increased demand for pharmaceuticals over
17
that period as new and more expensive drugs were developed.
Between 1986 and 1996, the increases in copayments and deductibles were associated
with larger prescription drug expenditure increases by high income households than low income
households.  In B.C., the introduction of universal deductibles predictably led to larger budget
share increases for low income seniors than for high income seniors.  But overall the pattern is
consistent with Figure 2: between 1986 and 1996, the prescription drug budget share seems to
increase by approximately the same amount, regardless of income.  This seems to suggest that
the incidence of the copayments and deductibles was not adversely redistributive, although this
is no doubt in part due to the fact that some of these provisions were income-contingent as
described in Table 1. 
As mentioned, we also conducted a regional regression analysis of budget share
although for brevity we will just summarize the results.  The nonparametric model used earlier
was followed except (again due to the smaller regional samples) the logarithm of  income was
entered linearly rather than nonparametrically and all the yearly data were pooled for each
region, with only a different intercept and log income coefficient for each year.  The essential
conclusion from both OLS and Tobit regressions was that between 1969 and 1986, prescription
drug programs only clearly flattened the downward-sloping Engel curve (that is appeared to
reduce budget share more for low income than for high income households) in Ontario and in
Quebec (although the effect had diminished by 1996), with some weaker evidence of a similar
effect in the Atlantic region.  The estimated Engel curve steepened to some extent in B.C. and
substantially in the Prairies over this period, consistent with the results in Table 4.  Estimated
changes in the Engel curve slope between 1986 and 1996 were mixed and tended to be small.
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The data on the percentage of zeroes is difficult to interpret because a zero-user could
be either (a) a household with no need of prescription drugs (would not purchase at any income
or any set of prices), (b) a household that receives all or virtually all of its prescription drugs at
the expense of a prescription drug plan, private or public (faces a price for prescription drugs of
essentially zero) or (c) a household in which there are health problems that would normally
require prescription drugs but does not purchase them because of cost (that is, a corner
solution: the household would purchase at different prices or income).  We do note, however,
that by the end of 1996 no provincial prescription drug plan offered 100% first dollar coverage
to either high or low income groups and in each case there are more zero-users among those
with low-income.  This suggests that low-income individuals are less likely to use the public
plan.  It seems unlikely that this is because of superior health status, or greater coverage by
private plans and hence it seems likely that some of this is a reaction to copayments.  This is
again some evidence in contradiction to our maintained assumption of negligible price
responses.
4.3 Large Users and Insurance
The reader will have noticed the “spray” of large users in Figure 1, suggesting that there
are some seniors with a very large budget share spent on prescription drugs. Our samples are
not large enough to capture enough large users for a detailed empirical analysis. While not
conclusive because of sample size, we can make the following observations.  First, most of the
large budget shares occur in 1969 (before the introduction of any drug plans for seniors) and
1996 (after the introduction of many copayments and deductables) while almost none are
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observed in 1986 (when the plans were at their most generous).  Second, most 1996 large users
were in the Prairie region where copayments are the highest.   We perhaps should re-emphasize
that among the efficiency arguments for prescription drug plans, one is to remedy an insurance
market failure due to adverse selection.  It seems to us, however,  that such an argument is
strongest for plans with out-of-pocket maximums that are income contingent and does not by
itself support plans which subsidize even small users.
Finally, Table 5 considers private plan health insurance expenditures.  We cannot
determine what portion of these plans include prescription drug coverage, although it is clear
some per user expenditures are extremely small and may be simply travel medical insurance or
some other sort of small policy.  By law, private insurance cannot cover ‘medically necessary’
hospital and physicians’ services which are provided to Canadians through their provincial
health insurance programs.  Private plans cover items such as prescription drugs, dental care,
eyeglasses, hearing aids, prosthetics, semiprivate and private hospital rooms as well as services
provided by non-physician personnel (such as chiropractors and physiotherapists).  While we
cannot determine the exact fraction of these plans which include prescription drug coverage,
industry information (Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association, 1994) suggests that
between 87% - 95% of private health insurance policy holders have coverage for prescription
medicines. It is clear that high income individuals pay more on average for such insurance but
there seems to be no relationship by region, i.e. the Atlantic and Prairie regions both have
relatively high per user prescription drug expenditures but only the former has much higher
insurance expenditures; both Quebec and British Columbia are relatively low in both respects
while Ontario has relatively low prescription drug expenditures but is about in the middle in
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terms of insurance costs.  As health insurance plans typically take advantage of existing
government coverage and in that way increases the usage of public provisions, our conjecture is
that the differential in insurance expenditures by income if anything suggests higher utilization
by higher income households than our previous analysis suggests (and hence less redistributive
benefit from prescription drug subsidies).
5. Discussion
In this paper we have reported evidence on the incidence by income of out-of-pocket
medical costs and prescription drug expenditures by Canadian senior households over the period
1969 to 1996.  Our focus has been on the question of the likely redistributional effects of
prescription drug plans, particularly in light of United States proposals for prescription drug
plans for the older population.  All Canadian provinces have both introduced and modified drug
plans for seniors during this period.
The first stage of our analysis confirms that throughout the period, absolute dollar
expenditures on prescription drugs have been higher for households with higher incomes while
the relationship between prescription drug budget shares and income is negative among seniors,
though not strongly so.  Thus what we have labeled in Section 2 the textbook analysis (which is
based on a first-order approximation that assumes price responses are negligible, a position that
is not sharply inconsistent with published empirical findings) would conclude that the incidence
of a prescription drug subsidy for seniors is less progressive than a per household cash transfer
but more progressive than a percentage-of-income cash transfer, though only mildly so. 
This textbook analysis involves a counterfactual statement which may be invalidated by
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either the nature of the subsidies under consideration (many include deductibles or copayments
with maximums, and so are not a proportional price adjustment) or by the way in which
expenditures on prescriptions drugs are determined (involving a patient - prescriber interaction,
for example).  Thus we have examined how the pattern of out-of-pocket prescription drug
expenditures has varied across regions and through time as Canada’s provincial governments
introduced and modified prescription drug plans for the older population.
We conclude that the introduction of a prescription drug plan changes the relationship
between out-of-pocket prescription drug expenditures and income, and the changes are very
different across plans.  The introduction of a subsidy tends to reduce absolute prescription drug
expenditures much more for high income individuals than for low income individuals, although
low income individuals typically have a greater reduction in budget share.  The key exception is
the Prairie region between 1969 and 1986.  The evidence, while incomplete, suggests on
balance (as the textbook analysis did) that prescription drug subsidies would be dominated on
income distribution grounds by a fixed per household transfer program of equal cost and would
not strongly dominate a program of equal cost featuring cash transfers equal to a fixed
percentage of a household’s income. 
As noted, both stages of our analysis rest on the assumption that price responses of out-
of-pocket prescription drug expenditures are small.  This assumption is consistent with the
findings of most existing empirical studies (as discussed in Section 2), although Grootendorst
(1997) is one recent study which estimates a large response (for low income single males in
British Columbia). Were price elasticities of prescription drug demand substantial, our analysis
would be more difficult to interpret.  For example, if a subsidy were to cause a substantial
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increase in prescription drug expenditures among low income individuals via a price response,
but not among high income users, then a progressive policy might appear regressive by our
criteria.  This highlights the fact that the price elasticities of low income individuals may be
particularly pertinent in a distributional analysis. 
Our data set is not well suited to an examination of price elasticities among different
income groups.  The principal difficulty is that we observe only total expenditures on all
prescription drugs and not quantities or individual prices.  However, two features of our data
are suggestive of price responses. First, the introduction of prescription drug subsidies with
significant copayments in the Prairie region between 1969 and 1986 led high income individuals
to reduce their prescription drug expenditure and budget share while both expenditure and
budget share increased for low income individuals.  One possibility is that this is a price effect
but there are other possibilities, including a combination of effects including an increase in
demand for pharmaceutical drugs over this period.  Second, in all regions there appeared to be
fewer zero users among higher income households (which again is open to several
interpretations).   
If low income households are more price responsive it suggests our analysis may at least
somewhat understate the redistributive benefits of prescription drug subsidies.  However, our
reading of the data is that the price elasticities would have to be quite large and quite different
by income groups to build any kind of redistributional case for the introduction (in the United
States,  for example) of a prescription drug subsidy for seniors over a fixed equal cash transfer. 
And if an incremental increase in the extant Canadian subsidies were introduced in 1996, it is
clear that one reason low income households might benefit less than high income households is
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that there are more zero users among low income households and a zero user does not benefit
from an incremental subsidy.
 Finally, we note as we did in the introduction that there are a number of efficiency
arguments that may be part of the case for prescription drug assistance.  Our analysis so far
suggests that, until and unless new evidence of substantial price elasticities for prescription
drugs among low income seniors is documented, the case for public prescription drug plans for
seniors should probably stand or fall on those efficiency considerations. 
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Table 1
Brief Summary of Prescription Drug Subsidy Programs for Seniors
by Province, Canada
Province Intro-
duction
Brief Description
Newfoundland Apr.
1980
Only low-income seniors covered, copayment = dispensing fee (typical value,
$7.61 in 1992) + 10% of ingredient cost if > $30.
Prince Edward
Island
Jan.
1986
Fixed copayment per prescription (e.g. $11.85 in 1992, $15.45 in 1999).
Nova Scotia Oct.
1974
Initially no copayment; June, 1990: fixed copayment $3 per prescription; since
June 1991 copayment = 20% of cost (min. $3) with various maximums (e.g. $150
in 1992), sometimes income-contingent; since April 1995 income-contingent
premiums up to $215/yr. (opt-out provision since Sept. 1996).
New Brunswick Jan.
1975
Initially no copayment; since Nov. 1983 fixed copayment per prescription  (e.g.
$7.05 in 1992, $9.05 in 1999) to annual maximum  for all seniors, initially $30,
raised to $45 (Jan. 1985); since Jan. 1988, maximum only allowed for lowest
income seniors and raised to $120 ($250 in April, 1996); since July, 1992,
premium for high-income seniors (e.g. $48/month in 1992). 
Quebec Aug.
1974
Initially no copayment, although first 2 years for low income seniors only, then
for all seniors (Oct. 1977); May 1992: copayment (except for low income seniors)
of $2 per prescription to annual maximum of $100; since August, 1996: 25%
copayment up to various income-contingent maximums (deductibles and income
contingent premiums since Jan.1997).
Ontario Sept.
1974
Initially no copayment, although first year for low income seniors only, then for
all seniors; since July, 1996: $2 per prescription for low income seniors; others
pay $6.11 per prescription above $100 deductible.
Manitoba July
1973
20% copayment and deductible (e.g. $106.60 in 1992); January, 1993: copayment
increased to 30%; beginning April 1996 zero copayment with income-contingent
deductible (2%-3% of household income).
Saskatchewan Sept.
1975
Initially fixed $2 copayment which increased to $3.95 by June 1987; since July
1987: copayment = 20%, then 25% (March, 1991), then 35% (May, 1992) plus
deductibles (initially family $75/yr, single $50/yr but since March 1993 semi-
annual $100 for low income senior, $850 for high-income senior); since March,
1993 semi-annual out-of-pocket limit of 1.7% of adjusted household income up to
$50,000.
Alberta July
1970
copayment = 20%, min[30%,$25] since June 1994, no premium since Jan. 1972
British
Columbia
Jan.
1959
Coverage for some low income seniors since 1959 (e.g. July 1972 $2 copayment
plus 50% of balance); July, 1973: program for all seniors, no-cost sharing; April,
1987: copayment = 75% of dispensing fee to $125 annual maximum; since April,
1994: copayment = 100% of dispensing fee to $200 annual maximum 
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Table 2
Mean Real Out-of-Pocket Direct Medical Expenditures, 
Nonsenior and Senior Households, Canada, 1969-1996
Direct Medical Expenditures
(excluding insurance)
Prescription Drugs
Nonseniors Seniors Nonseniors Seniors
1969 $813 $620 $201 $228
1974 $597 $420 $139 $172
1984 $557 $399 $94 $78
1986 $547 $451 $91 $71
1990 $594 $561 $113 $129
1992 $615 $570 $129 $158
1996 $636 $712 $141 $222
All values deflated to 1992 dollars using CPI.
28
Table 3
Coefficients from Semiparametric Regression 
With Prescription Drug Expendiure Share Variable as Dependent Variable and Log of Total
Expenditure as “Nonparametric Variable”
1969 1986 1996
Variable Coefficients (×10-2)
Female (=1 if female)
Married ( = 1 if Married)
Age (household head)
Age*Female
ln(Household size)
ln(Household size) squared
Atlantic province (=1, 0 otherwise)
Quebec (=1, 0 otherwise)
Prairie province (=1, 0 otherwise)
BC (=1, 0 otherwise)
Constant
Number of Observations
R2
2.262  
[.77]  
1.360  
[3.96] 
0.055  
[2.05] 
-0.022 
[-.55] 
-0.453 
[-.63] 
-0.050 
[-.1]  
1.283  
[3.75] 
0.796  
[2.52] 
0.325  
[1.15] 
-0.536 
[-1.71]
0.001  
[.01]  
757    
  0.07 
-1.517 
[-1.04]
-0.283 
[-1.21]
0.001  
[.07]  
0.024  
[1.23] 
1.052  
[2.09] 
-0.324 
[-.88] 
0.593  
[3.8]  
0.037  
[.24]  
0.801  
[6.02] 
0.028  
[.18]  
0.000  
[0]    
788    
  0.09 
-1.563 
[-.87] 
0.858  
[3.5]  
0.008  
[.43]  
0.028  
[1.15] 
-0.729 
[-1.16]
0.881  
[1.74] 
1.297  
[7.42] 
0.592  
[2.94] 
1.975  
[11.71]
0.370  
[2.01] 
-0.001 
[-.01] 
1493   
  0.12 
Notes:
1. T-statistics in brackets.
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Table 4
Real Out-of-Pocket Prescription Drug Expenditures: Mean, Budget Share
 and Percentage of Zeroes, 
Seniors, High Income and Low Income Groups, 
by Region, Canada, 1969-1996
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairies B.C.
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
1969 $354
(.015)
22%
$159
(.027)
46%
$368
(.015)
39%
$159
(.025)
45%
$274
(.012)
24%
$123
(.019)
53%
$265
(.012)
21%
$89
(.013)
53%
$235
(.009)
31%
$32
(.006)
75%
1974 $535
(.025)
19%
$170
(.023)
56%
$308
(014)
24%
$91
(.013)
55%
$247
(.010)
22%
$64
(.009)
53%
$176
(.008)
38%
$120
(.017)
39%
$7
(.000)
87%
$4
(.000) 
94%
1984 $203
(.008)
50%
$124
(.017)
43%
$115
(.004)
35%
$14
(.002)
74%
$26
(.001)
75%
$0
(.000)
100%
$118
(.005)
20%
$109
(.014)
28%
$51
(.002)
81%
$14
(.001)
88%
1986 $129
(.005)
50%
$76
(.008)
53%
$51
(.002)
61%
$34
(.004)
76%
$54
(.001)
67%
$6
(.001)
93%
$139
(.005)
22%
$139
(.018)
25%
$8
(.000)
89%
$7
(.001) 
87%
1990 $150
(.006)
30%
$205
(.024)
40%
$243
(.009)
68%
$51
(.007)
81%
$66
(.003)
74%
$7
(.001)
96%
$253
(.008)
20%
$179
(.021)
23%
$63
(.002)
33%
$41
(.005)
50%
1992 $191
(.007)
35%
$208
(.023)
28%
$129
(.004)
27%
$29
(.003)
50%
$60
(.002)
80%
$10
(.001)
84%
$382
(.015)
21%
$208
(.024)
35%
$80
(.003)
33%
$58
(.007)
39%
1996 $454
(.017)
15%
$172
(.020)
23%
$240
(.009)
19%
$124
(.013)
31%
$192
(.006)
26%
$34
(.004)
49%
$515
(.018)
12%
$264
(.030)
33%
$129
(.005)
21%
$87
(.011)
25%
Notes: The $ value in each cell is mean usage, the value below it in parentheses is the budget share and
the % value is the percentage with zero prescription drug expenditure (defined as $5 or less). High
income is defined as in the top 25% of total outlay; low income is defined as in the bottom 25% of total
outlay.
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Table 5
Real Out-of-Pocket Private Health Insurance Expenditures: Means
 and Percentage Nonzero Incidence, 
Seniors, High Income and Low Income Groups, 
by Region, Canada, 1969-1996
Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairies B.C.
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
1969 $49
52%
$16
27%
$63
57%
$4
10%
$7
10%
$0
0%
$22
47%
$3
2%
$1
4%
$0
0%
1974 $32
38%
$8
15%
$27
27%
$1
2%
$22
34%
$4
19%
$8
43%
$4
33%
$1
10%
$0
3%
1984 $129
70%
$59
33%
$20
20%
$15
13%
$192
75%
$27
18%
$51
78%
$11
42%
$37
39%
$0
3%
1986 $142
69%
$21
12%
$80
29%
$5
3%
$105
53%
$28
17%
$97
71%
$21
33%
$121
38%
$12
10%
1990 $242
67%
$69
29%
$172
37%
$14
9%
$187
57%
$61
22%
$123
59%
$46
61%
$49
31%
$4
12%
1992 $256
55%
$48
32%
$214
33%
$9
6%
$181
53%
$73
23%
$181
74%
$58
42%
$42
28%
$15
11%
1996 $542
84%
$107
30%
$223
51%
$32
15%
$318
42%
$45
13%
$299
63%
$57
44%
$80
26%
$14
7%
Notes: The $ value in each cell is mean usage and the % value is the percentage with nonzero
expenditures. High income is defined as in the top 25% of total outlay; low income is defined as in the
bottom 25% of total outlay.
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